Abstract
In this paper we explore the extent to which a group of N wind power producers can exploit the statistical benefits of aggregation and quantity risk sharing by forming a willing coalition to pool their variable power to jointly offer their aggregate power output as single entity into a forward energy market. We prove that wind power generators will always improve their expected profit when they aggregate their generated power and use tools from coalitional game theory to design fair sharing mechanisms to allocate the payoff among the coalition participants. We show that the corresponding coalitional game is super-additive and has a nonempty core. Hence, there always exists a mechanism for profit-sharing that makes the coalition stable. However, the game is not convex and the celebrated Shapley value may not belong to the core of the game. An allocation mechanism that minimizes the worst-case dissatisfaction is proposed. © 2011 IEEE.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) |
| Pages | 3000-3007 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781612848013 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01Acknowledged KAUST grant number(s): 025478
Acknowledgements: Supported in part by OOF991-KAUST US LIMITED under awardnumber 025478, the UC Discovery Grant ele07-10283 under the IMPACTprogram, NSF under Grant EECS-0925337, the Florida Energy SystemsConsortium, and Plan Nacional I+D+I of Spain under grant DPI2008-05795.
This publication acknowledges KAUST support, but has no KAUST affiliated authors.