Abstract
Load-altering attacks (LAAs) pose a significant threat to power systems with Internet of Things (IoT)-controllable load devices. This research examines the detrimental impact of LAAs on the voltage profile of distribution systems, taking into account the realistic load model with constant impedance Z, constant current I, and constant power P (ZIP). We derive closed-form expressions for computing the voltages of buses following LAA by making approximations to the power flow as well as the load model. We also characterize the minimum number of devices to be manipulated in order to cause voltage safety violations in the system. We conduct extensive simulations using the IEEE-33 bus system to verify the accuracy of the proposed approximations and highlight the difference between the attack impacts while considering constant power and the ZIP load model (which is more representative of real-world loads).
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | 2024 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2024 |
Publisher | IEEE Computer Society |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9798350381832 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2024 |
Event | 2024 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2024 - Seattle, United States Duration: Jul 21 2024 → Jul 25 2024 |
Publication series
Name | IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting |
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ISSN (Print) | 1944-9925 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1944-9933 |
Conference
Conference | 2024 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2024 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Seattle |
Period | 07/21/24 → 07/25/24 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 IEEE.
Keywords
- Cybersecurity
- distribution system
- IoT-controllable devices
- load altering attack
- voltage profile
- ZIP load
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Energy Engineering and Power Technology
- Nuclear Energy and Engineering
- Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering