Security assessment and impact analysis of cyberattacks in integrated T&D power systems

Ioannis Zografopoulos; Charalambos Konstantinou; Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos; Dan Zhu; Robert Broadwater

doi:10.1145/3470481.3472706

Security assessment and impact analysis of cyberattacks in integrated T&D power systems

Ioannis Zografopoulos, Charalambos Konstantinou, Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos, Dan Zhu, Robert Broadwater

King Abdullah University of Science and Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the impact of cyberattacks in an integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) power grid model with distributed energy resource (DER) integration. We adopt the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to identify critical system assets, enumerate potential threats, analyze, and prioritize risks for threat scenarios. Based on the analysis, attack strategies and exploitation scenarios are identified which could lead to system compromise. Specifically, we investigate the impact of data integrity attacks in inverted-based solar PV controllers, control signal blocking attacks in protective switches and breakers, and coordinated monitoring and switching time-delay attacks.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems
Publisher	ACM
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3470481.3472706
State	Published - May 19 2021

Bibliographical note

KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2021-10-15
Acknowledgements: This work was supported in part by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) under the Solar Energy Technology Office (SETO) Award Number DE-EE0008768.

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10.1145/3470481.3472706

https://repository.kaust.edu.sa/bitstream/10754/672844/1/3470481.3472706.pdf

Cite this

@inproceedings{780372ebf17e427d9b0ea8102a6b2cd1,

title = "Security assessment and impact analysis of cyberattacks in integrated T&D power systems",

abstract = "In this paper, we examine the impact of cyberattacks in an integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) power grid model with distributed energy resource (DER) integration. We adopt the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to identify critical system assets, enumerate potential threats, analyze, and prioritize risks for threat scenarios. Based on the analysis, attack strategies and exploitation scenarios are identified which could lead to system compromise. Specifically, we investigate the impact of data integrity attacks in inverted-based solar PV controllers, control signal blocking attacks in protective switches and breakers, and coordinated monitoring and switching time-delay attacks.",

author = "Ioannis Zografopoulos and Charalambos Konstantinou and Tsoutsos, {Nektarios Georgios} and Dan Zhu and Robert Broadwater",

note = "KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2021-10-15 Acknowledgements: This work was supported in part by the U.S. Department of Energy{\textquoteright}s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) under the Solar Energy Technology Office (SETO) Award Number DE-EE0008768.",

year = "2021",

month = may,

day = "19",

doi = "10.1145/3470481.3472706",

language = "English (US)",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems",

publisher = "ACM",

}

Security assessment and impact analysis of cyberattacks in integrated T&D power systems. / Zografopoulos, Ioannis; Konstantinou, Charalambos; Tsoutsos, Nektarios Georgios et al.
Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems. ACM, 2021.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Security assessment and impact analysis of cyberattacks in integrated T&D power systems

AU - Zografopoulos, Ioannis

AU - Konstantinou, Charalambos

AU - Tsoutsos, Nektarios Georgios

AU - Zhu, Dan

AU - Broadwater, Robert

N1 - KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2021-10-15 Acknowledgements: This work was supported in part by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) under the Solar Energy Technology Office (SETO) Award Number DE-EE0008768.

PY - 2021/5/19

Y1 - 2021/5/19

N2 - In this paper, we examine the impact of cyberattacks in an integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) power grid model with distributed energy resource (DER) integration. We adopt the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to identify critical system assets, enumerate potential threats, analyze, and prioritize risks for threat scenarios. Based on the analysis, attack strategies and exploitation scenarios are identified which could lead to system compromise. Specifically, we investigate the impact of data integrity attacks in inverted-based solar PV controllers, control signal blocking attacks in protective switches and breakers, and coordinated monitoring and switching time-delay attacks.

AB - In this paper, we examine the impact of cyberattacks in an integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) power grid model with distributed energy resource (DER) integration. We adopt the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to identify critical system assets, enumerate potential threats, analyze, and prioritize risks for threat scenarios. Based on the analysis, attack strategies and exploitation scenarios are identified which could lead to system compromise. Specifically, we investigate the impact of data integrity attacks in inverted-based solar PV controllers, control signal blocking attacks in protective switches and breakers, and coordinated monitoring and switching time-delay attacks.

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10754/672844

UR - https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3470481.3472706

U2 - 10.1145/3470481.3472706

DO - 10.1145/3470481.3472706

M3 - Conference contribution

BT - Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems

PB - ACM

ER -

Security assessment and impact analysis of cyberattacks in integrated T&D power systems

Abstract

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