Resilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacks

Farhan M. Aziz, Jeff S. Shamma, Gordon L. Stuber

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

27 Scopus citations


Commercial LTE networks are being studied for mission-critical applications, such as public safety and smart grid communications. In this paper, LTE networks are shown vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DOS) and loss of service attacks from smart jammers, who may employ simple narrowband jamming techniques to attack without any need to hack the network or its users. We modeled the utilities of jamming and anti-jamming actions played by the jammer and the network under the framework of single-shot and repeated Bayesian games. In a single-shot game formulation the only Nash Equilibria (NE) are pure strategy equilibria at which network utility is severely compromised. We propose a repeated-game learning and strategy algorithm for the network that outperforms single-shot games by a significant margin. Furthermore, all of our proposed actions and algorithms can be implemented with current technology.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781479935123
StatePublished - Feb 17 2015

Bibliographical note

KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01


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