Randomized intrusion-tolerant asynchronous services

Henrique Moniz; Nuno Ferreira Neves; Miguel Correia; Paulo Verissimo

doi:10.1109/DSN.2006.60

Randomized intrusion-tolerant asynchronous services

Henrique Moniz, Nuno Ferreira Neves, Miguel Correia, Paulo Verissimo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

Randomized agreement protocols have been around for more than two decades. Often assumed to be inef dent due to their high expected communication and time complexities, they have remained largely overlooked by the community-at-large as a valid solution for the deployment of fault-tolerant distributed systems. This paper aims to demonstrate that randomization can be a very competitive approach even in hostile environments where arbitrary faults can occur. A stack of randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols is described and its performance evaluated under different faultloads. The stack provides a set of relevant services ranging from basic communication primitives up to atomic broadcast. The experimental evaluation shows that the protocols are ef cient and no performance reduction is observed under certain Byzantine faults. © 2006 IEEE.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Pages	568-577
Number of pages	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2006.60
State	Published - Dec 22 2006
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Generated from Scopus record by KAUST IRTS on 2021-03-16

Access to Document

10.1109/DSN.2006.60

Cite this

@inproceedings{feca00d971f040c1b55e506a68c8eca6,

title = "Randomized intrusion-tolerant asynchronous services",

abstract = "Randomized agreement protocols have been around for more than two decades. Often assumed to be inef dent due to their high expected communication and time complexities, they have remained largely overlooked by the community-at-large as a valid solution for the deployment of fault-tolerant distributed systems. This paper aims to demonstrate that randomization can be a very competitive approach even in hostile environments where arbitrary faults can occur. A stack of randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols is described and its performance evaluated under different faultloads. The stack provides a set of relevant services ranging from basic communication primitives up to atomic broadcast. The experimental evaluation shows that the protocols are ef cient and no performance reduction is observed under certain Byzantine faults. {\textcopyright} 2006 IEEE.",

author = "Henrique Moniz and Neves, {Nuno Ferreira} and Miguel Correia and Paulo Verissimo",

note = "Generated from Scopus record by KAUST IRTS on 2021-03-16",

year = "2006",

month = dec,

day = "22",

doi = "10.1109/DSN.2006.60",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "0769526071",

pages = "568--577",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Randomized intrusion-tolerant asynchronous services

AU - Moniz, Henrique

AU - Neves, Nuno Ferreira

AU - Correia, Miguel

AU - Verissimo, Paulo

N1 - Generated from Scopus record by KAUST IRTS on 2021-03-16

PY - 2006/12/22

Y1 - 2006/12/22

N2 - Randomized agreement protocols have been around for more than two decades. Often assumed to be inef dent due to their high expected communication and time complexities, they have remained largely overlooked by the community-at-large as a valid solution for the deployment of fault-tolerant distributed systems. This paper aims to demonstrate that randomization can be a very competitive approach even in hostile environments where arbitrary faults can occur. A stack of randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols is described and its performance evaluated under different faultloads. The stack provides a set of relevant services ranging from basic communication primitives up to atomic broadcast. The experimental evaluation shows that the protocols are ef cient and no performance reduction is observed under certain Byzantine faults. © 2006 IEEE.

AB - Randomized agreement protocols have been around for more than two decades. Often assumed to be inef dent due to their high expected communication and time complexities, they have remained largely overlooked by the community-at-large as a valid solution for the deployment of fault-tolerant distributed systems. This paper aims to demonstrate that randomization can be a very competitive approach even in hostile environments where arbitrary faults can occur. A stack of randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols is described and its performance evaluated under different faultloads. The stack provides a set of relevant services ranging from basic communication primitives up to atomic broadcast. The experimental evaluation shows that the protocols are ef cient and no performance reduction is observed under certain Byzantine faults. © 2006 IEEE.

UR - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1633545/

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33845597282&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/DSN.2006.60

DO - 10.1109/DSN.2006.60

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 0769526071

SP - 568

EP - 577

BT - Proceedings of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks

ER -

Randomized intrusion-tolerant asynchronous services

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this