Power analysis of a chaos-based random number generator for cryptographic security

Fabio Pareschi, Giuseppe Scotti, Luca Giancane, Riccardo Rovatti, Gianluca Setti, Alessandro Trifiletti

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we consider a side-channel attack on a chaos-based Random Number Generator (RNG) based on power consumption analysis. The aim of this attack is to verify if it is possible to retrieve information regarding the internal state of the chaotic system used to generate the random bits. In fact, one of the most common arguments against this kind of RNGs is that, due to the deterministic nature of the chaotic circuit on which they rely, the system cannot be truly unpredictable. Here we analyze the power consumption profile of a chaos-based RNG prototype we designed in 0.35 μm CMOS technology, showing that for the proposed circuit the internal state (and therefore the future evolution) of the system cannot be determined with a side-channel attack based on a power analysis. This property makes the proposed RNG perfectly suitable for high-security cryptographic applications. ©2009 IEEE.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems
Pages2858-2861
Number of pages4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 26 2009
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Generated from Scopus record by KAUST IRTS on 2023-02-15

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