Hop integrity in computer networks

Mohamed G. Gouda; E. N. Elnozahy; Chin Tser Huang; Tommy M. McGuire

doi:10.1109/TNET.2002.1012363

Hop integrity in computer networks

Mohamed G. Gouda^*, E. N. Elnozahy, Chin Tser Huang, Tommy M. McGuire

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

A computer network is said to provide hop integrity iff when any router p in the network receives a message m supposedly from an adjacent router q, then p can check that m was indeed sent by q, was not modified after it was sent, and was not a replay of an old message sent from q to p. In this paper, we describe three protocols that can be added to the routers in a computer network so that the network can provide hop integrity, and thus overcome most denial-of-service attacks. These three protocols are a secret exchange protocol, a weak integrity protocol, and a strong integrity protocol. All three protocols are stateless, require small overhead, and do not constrain the network protocol in the routers in any way.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	308-319
Number of pages	12
Journal	IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Volume	10
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2002.1012363
State	Published - Jun 2002
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Authentication
Denial-of-service attack
Internet
Message modification
Message replay
Network protocol
Router
SYN attack
Security
Smurf attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Computer Science Applications
Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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10.1109/TNET.2002.1012363

Cite this

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title = "Hop integrity in computer networks",

abstract = "A computer network is said to provide hop integrity iff when any router p in the network receives a message m supposedly from an adjacent router q, then p can check that m was indeed sent by q, was not modified after it was sent, and was not a replay of an old message sent from q to p. In this paper, we describe three protocols that can be added to the routers in a computer network so that the network can provide hop integrity, and thus overcome most denial-of-service attacks. These three protocols are a secret exchange protocol, a weak integrity protocol, and a strong integrity protocol. All three protocols are stateless, require small overhead, and do not constrain the network protocol in the routers in any way.",

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AU - Elnozahy, E. N.

AU - Huang, Chin Tser

AU - McGuire, Tommy M.

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AB - A computer network is said to provide hop integrity iff when any router p in the network receives a message m supposedly from an adjacent router q, then p can check that m was indeed sent by q, was not modified after it was sent, and was not a replay of an old message sent from q to p. In this paper, we describe three protocols that can be added to the routers in a computer network so that the network can provide hop integrity, and thus overcome most denial-of-service attacks. These three protocols are a secret exchange protocol, a weak integrity protocol, and a strong integrity protocol. All three protocols are stateless, require small overhead, and do not constrain the network protocol in the routers in any way.

KW - Authentication

KW - Denial-of-service attack

KW - Internet

KW - Message modification

KW - Message replay

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KW - Router

KW - SYN attack

KW - Security

KW - Smurf attack

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Hop integrity in computer networks

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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