Gone rogue: An analysis of rogue security software campaigns

Marco Cova, Corrado Leita, Olivier Thonnard, Angelos Keromytis, Marc Dacier

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the past few years, Internet miscreants have developed a number of techniques to defraud and make a hefty profit out of their unsuspecting victims. A troubling, recent example of this trend is cybercriminals distributing rogue security software, that is malicious programs that, by pretending to be legitimate security tools (e.g., anti-virus or anti-spyware), deceive users into paying a substantial amount of money in exchange for little or no protection. While the technical and economical aspects of rogue security software (e.g., its distribution and monetization mechanisms) are relatively well-understood, much less is known about the campaigns through which this type of malware is distributed, that is what are the underlying techniques and coordinated efforts employed by cyber-criminals to spread their malware. In this paper, we present the techniques we used to analyze rogue security software campaigns, with an emphasis on the infrastructure employed in the campaign and the life-cycle of the clients that they infect. © 2009 IEEE.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEC2ND 2009 - European Conference on Computer Network Defense
PublisherIEEE Computer Societyhelp@computer.org
Pages1-3
Number of pages3
ISBN (Print)9780769539836
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2009
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Generated from Scopus record by KAUST IRTS on 2022-09-12

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