TY - GEN
T1 - Global games with noisy sharing of information
AU - Touri, Behrouz
AU - Shamma, Jeff S.
N1 - KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01
PY - 2015/2/17
Y1 - 2015/2/17
N2 - We provide a framework for the study of global games with noisy sharing of information. In contrast to the previous works where it is shown that an intuitive threshold policy is an equilibrium for such games, we show that noisy sharing of information leads to non-existence of such an equilibrium. We also investigate the group best-response dynamics of two groups of agents sharing the same information to threshold policies based on each group's observation and show the convergence of such dynamics.
AB - We provide a framework for the study of global games with noisy sharing of information. In contrast to the previous works where it is shown that an intuitive threshold policy is an equilibrium for such games, we show that noisy sharing of information leads to non-existence of such an equilibrium. We also investigate the group best-response dynamics of two groups of agents sharing the same information to threshold policies based on each group's observation and show the convergence of such dynamics.
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10754/550510
UR - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/wrapper.htm?arnumber=7040087
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84961992596&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2014.7040087
DO - 10.1109/CDC.2014.7040087
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 9781467360906
SP - 4473
EP - 4478
BT - 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
ER -