Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints

Lichun Li; Eric Feron; Jeff S. Shamma

doi:10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083

Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints

Lichun Li, Eric Feron, Jeff S. Shamma

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

In asymmetric zero-sum games, one player has superior information about the game over the other. It is known that the informed players (maximizer) face the tradeoff of exploiting its superior information at the cost of revealing its superior information, but the basic point of the uninformed player (minimizer)'s decision making remains unknown. This paper studies the finite stage asymmetric repeated games from both players' viewpoints, and derives that not only security strategies but also the opponents' corresponding best responses depends only on the informed player's history action sequences. Moreover, efficient LP formulations to compute both player's security strategies are provided.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Pages	5310-5315
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Print)	9781509018376
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083
State	Published - Jan 5 2017

Bibliographical note

KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01
Acknowledgements: The authors acknowledge the financial support of ARO project #W911NF-09-1-0553 and the AFOSR/MURI project #FA9550-10-1-0573

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10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083

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title = "Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints",

abstract = "In asymmetric zero-sum games, one player has superior information about the game over the other. It is known that the informed players (maximizer) face the tradeoff of exploiting its superior information at the cost of revealing its superior information, but the basic point of the uninformed player (minimizer)'s decision making remains unknown. This paper studies the finite stage asymmetric repeated games from both players' viewpoints, and derives that not only security strategies but also the opponents' corresponding best responses depends only on the informed player's history action sequences. Moreover, efficient LP formulations to compute both player's security strategies are provided.",

author = "Lichun Li and Eric Feron and Shamma, {Jeff S.}",

note = "KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01 Acknowledgements: The authors acknowledge the financial support of ARO project #W911NF-09-1-0553 and the AFOSR/MURI project #FA9550-10-1-0573",

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doi = "10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083",

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AU - Li, Lichun

AU - Feron, Eric

AU - Shamma, Jeff S.

N1 - KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01 Acknowledgements: The authors acknowledge the financial support of ARO project #W911NF-09-1-0553 and the AFOSR/MURI project #FA9550-10-1-0573

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Y1 - 2017/1/5

N2 - In asymmetric zero-sum games, one player has superior information about the game over the other. It is known that the informed players (maximizer) face the tradeoff of exploiting its superior information at the cost of revealing its superior information, but the basic point of the uninformed player (minimizer)'s decision making remains unknown. This paper studies the finite stage asymmetric repeated games from both players' viewpoints, and derives that not only security strategies but also the opponents' corresponding best responses depends only on the informed player's history action sequences. Moreover, efficient LP formulations to compute both player's security strategies are provided.

AB - In asymmetric zero-sum games, one player has superior information about the game over the other. It is known that the informed players (maximizer) face the tradeoff of exploiting its superior information at the cost of revealing its superior information, but the basic point of the uninformed player (minimizer)'s decision making remains unknown. This paper studies the finite stage asymmetric repeated games from both players' viewpoints, and derives that not only security strategies but also the opponents' corresponding best responses depends only on the informed player's history action sequences. Moreover, efficient LP formulations to compute both player's security strategies are provided.

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10754/622893

UR - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7799083/

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85010801613&partnerID=8YFLogxK

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DO - 10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9781509018376

SP - 5310

EP - 5315

BT - 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

ER -

Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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