Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach

Daniel Cracau; Benjamin Franz

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036

Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach

Daniel Cracau, Benjamin Franz

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1-4
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	120
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036
State	Published - Jul 2013
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01
Acknowledged KAUST grant number(s): KUK-C1-013-04
Acknowledgements: We are very grateful to Eugen Dimant and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.The second author would like to thank the financial support from the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007–2013/ERC grant agreement No. 239870. His work is also partly supported by Award No KUK-C1-013-04, made by King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST).
This publication acknowledges KAUST support, but has no KAUST affiliated authors.

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036

Cite this

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title = "Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach",

abstract = "We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases. {\textcopyright} 2013 Elsevier B.V.",

author = "Daniel Cracau and Benjamin Franz",

note = "KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01 Acknowledged KAUST grant number(s): KUK-C1-013-04 Acknowledgements: We are very grateful to Eugen Dimant and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.The second author would like to thank the financial support from the European Research Council under the European Community{\textquoteright}s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007–2013/ERC grant agreement No. 239870. His work is also partly supported by Award No KUK-C1-013-04, made by King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). This publication acknowledges KAUST support, but has no KAUST affiliated authors.",

year = "2013",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036",

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AU - Cracau, Daniel

AU - Franz, Benjamin

N1 - KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01 Acknowledged KAUST grant number(s): KUK-C1-013-04 Acknowledgements: We are very grateful to Eugen Dimant and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.The second author would like to thank the financial support from the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007–2013/ERC grant agreement No. 239870. His work is also partly supported by Award No KUK-C1-013-04, made by King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). This publication acknowledges KAUST support, but has no KAUST affiliated authors.

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AB - We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

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UR - https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176513001456

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1

ER -

Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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