Asphalion: Trustworthy shielding against byzantine faults

Byzantine fault-tolerant state-machine replication (BFT-SMR) is a technique for hardening systems to tolerate arbitrary faults. Although robust, BFT-SMR protocols are very costly in terms of the number of required replicas (3f + 1 to tolerate f faults) and of exchanged messages. However, with łhybridž architectures, where łnormalž components trust some łspecialž components to provide properties in a trustworthy manner, the cost of using BFT can be dramatically reduced. Unfortunately, even though such hybridization techniques decrease the message/time/space complexity of BFT protocols, they also increase their structural complexity. Therefore, we introduce Asphalion, the first theorem prover-based framework for verifying implementations of hybrid systems and protocols. It relies on three novel languages: (1) HyLoE: A Hybrid Logic of Events to reason about hybrid fault models; (2) MoC: A Monadic Component language to implement systems as collections of interacting hybrid components; and (3) LoCK: A sound Logic of events-based Calculus of Knowledge to reason about both homogeneous and hybrid systems at a high-level of abstraction (thereby allowing reusing proofs, and capturing the high-level logic of distributed systems). In addition, Asphalion supports compositional reasoning, e.g., through mechanisms to lift properties about trusted-trustworthy components, to the level of the distributed systems they are integrated in. As a case study, we have verified crucial safety properties (e.g., agreement) of several implementations of hybrid protocols.