Smart grid aims to improve control and monitoring routines to ensure reliable and efficient supply of electricity. The rapid advancements in information and communication technologies of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks, however, have resulted in complex cyber physical systems. This added complexity has broadened the attack surface of power-related applications, amplifying their susceptibility to cyber threats. A particular class of system integrity attacks against the smart grid is False Data Injection (FDI). In a successful FDI attack, an adversary compromises the readings of grid sensors in such a way that errors introduced into estimates of state variables remain undetected. This paper presents an end-to-end case study of how to instantiate real FDI attacks to the Alternating Current (AC) -nonlinear- State Estimation (SE) process. The attack is realized through firmware modifications of the microprocessor-based remote terminal systems, falsifying the data transmitted to the SE routine, and proceeds regardless of perfect or imperfect knowledge of the current system state. The case study concludes with an investigation of an attack on the IEEE 14 bus system using load data from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO).
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||CPS-SPC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, co-located with CCS 2016|
|Publisher||Association for Computing Machinery, Incacmhelp@acm.org|
|Number of pages||11|
|State||Published - Oct 28 2016|